Army working to bridge differences with Iraqis

By Capt. Matt Fitzwater

MOSUL, Iraq May 17, 2008 08:23 pm

— The United States Army’s field manual for conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations lists nine paradoxes of COIN that make current operations in Iraq counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war.
These paradoxes reveal the complex and often unfamiliar set of missions and considerations units associated with operating in a COIN environment must consider. During a four-week span in which Team Phoenix conducted 13 joint patrols with 3/4/2 IA, including three major operations, we experienced two of the COIN paradoxes.
As members of the most powerful and professional Army in the world, it is often hard for my team to watch our Iraqi brothers conduct missions to a lower standard than we would expect ourselves to operate. When 3/4/2 IA conducts mission planning and operations, it is always at a much inferior level than any United States Army unit. However, a paradox of COIN is, “The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.”
As the United States continues to support Iraq, long-term success requires establishing a viable Iraqi Army that can establish security without substantial U.S. support. The three major operations conducted by 3/4/2 IA in the past month demonstrate that this unit can tactically support itself without significant U.S. assistance.
While sitting in his office drinking tea, Maj. Fakher, the 3/4/2 IA battalion commander, received a phone call from an intelligence source detailing the location of insurgents in a nearby neighborhood. Without any mission planning and little thought to contingency plans, Fakher organized a small patrol in less than 10 minutes to conduct a raid on the insurgents’ location. In addition to the units’ quick response to the intelligence, the commander decided the mission would be conducted utilizing civilian vehicles and wearing civilian clothing. By conducting the mission in civilian attire and vehicles, the battalion was able to detain four insurgents without their actions being compromised.
A U.S. Army unit would never conduct a mission without prior planning, nor could an American unit blend in with the populace by wearing civilian attire. Although the conduct of the mission was different from the typical U.S. approach, the operation demonstrated that the host nation could conduct operations in a more than tolerable manner.
During a cordon and search of the Al Kahira neighborhood in eastern Mosul, Fakher disarmed an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The IED consisted of three artillery rounds with a cellular phone detonation device. After ripping the cellular phone off of the IED, Fakher received a phone call on that cellular phone. The phone call was from the insurgent responsible for emplacing the IED. The insurgent stated the IED was not for the Iraqi Army, but for the Americans who occupied the country. The insurgent also complained to Fakher that he would not receive any payment for the IED and that he needed money to support his family. Throughout the course of the operation, Fakher talked to the insurgent five more times, eventually convincing him to act as a paid source for 3/4/2 IA. The man who was an insurgent only hours before now began working for the battalion in exchange for the location of future IEDs.
Within 24 hours, the insurgent informed the battalion of several IED locations that were able to be disarmed before detonating on Iraqi or U.S. forces. An American commander would have utilized an explosive ordnance disposal team to disarm the IED and would never have been able to convince an insurgent to work for the coalition. This is another example of the host nation doing something tolerably rather than us trying to do it well.
Since completing construction of a combat outpost (COP) in the Rashidayah neighborhood of Mosul in late March, 3/4/2 IA has had 24-hour presence in a community riddled with insurgents. Daily patrols in the neighborhood and a never ending presence at the COP paid dividends during a recent raid. 3/4/2 IA, along with Team Phoenix and a partnered U.S. Army cavalry troop, conducted a joint raid on 13 targets in Rashidayah. Our Iraqi Army counterparts utilized sources they had developed during patrols in the neighborhood to target the insurgent cell that operated there. The mission resulted in four detainees that were list of targets for the mission.
Although 3/4/2 IA did not establish a command and control center to supervise the mission, provide imagery to subordinate units to locate target houses or create graphic control measures that would aid in lessening the possibility of fratricide, the operation was a success. The battalion commander was able to command and control a multi-unit operation that was raiding target houses simultaneously while personally searching target houses and interrogating detainees. The unit did not conduct the operation in the same manner as an American unit would have, but the success of the mission produced a very tolerable result for the host nation Army.
The tactical success experienced by 3/4/2 IA on the previously described missions is definitely a building block for future successes. However, the unit did little to correct its systemic problems of lack of soldier accountability, adhering to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense leave policy, and maintaining its vehicles and equipment. On all battalion level operations in the last month, the 3/4/2 IA Battalion leadership has only been able to muster approximately 70 soldiers to conduct the mission. This is unacceptable for a unit that currently has 134 percent of its authorized number of soldiers. In addition, lack of mission-capable vehicles forced the unit to transport soldiers to the objective on two missions in the back of five-ton trucks that provided no protection.
These events demonstrated another COIN paradox experienced by Team Phoenix during the month. “Tactical success guarantees nothing” is a paradox that can be applied to 3/4/2 IA. As important as tactical success is to achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in a COIN environment. Tactical success must be linked to establishing an Army that can not only shoot, but can move, communicate and sustain itself for extended periods of time. If conducting operations reduces the number of mission-capable vehicles to an unsustainable level, then the success gained comes at a high cost. Also, if conducting combat operations forces the unit to place every soldier on mission rather than having a percentage of soldiers conduct sustainment operations, then the tactical success is not beneficial. Due to the tactical success enjoyed by the unit, 3/4/2 IA leadership now has a false sense of their ability and has not committed to the “Train the Trainer” program invented by Team Phoenix. The program only saw five days of attendance during the past month, demonstrating the 3/4/2 IA leadership’s lack of commitment to training.
The paradoxes of COIN that my team experienced during the last four weeks display the complexity of advising a host nation unit engaged in daily combat operations. Team Phoenix must now find a way to help 3/4/2 IA build a bridge between tactical success and fixing important systematic issues. If we cannot build this bridge, then the unit and Iraq may sink in a river of insurgency.